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"WHAT'S IN A NAME?"':
CIVIL UNIONS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF "MARRIAGE"
Misha Isaak*
"The fight over gay marriage has become a fight over ownership of a word.
But what a potent little word it is."
2
INTRODUCTION
Few issues today are as salient or contentious as same-sex mar-
riage. 3 Increasingly, same-sex couples have come out of the closet, liv-
ing openly in monogamous relationships while raising children.4 As
gays and lesbians have earned greater societal acceptance,' and as
their relationships have come to appear more like mainstream het-
erosexual unions, many same-sex couples have demanded all of the
same privileges, rights, and obligations afforded by law to their
straight counterparts.' With limited success in the country's legisla-
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO ANDJULIET act 2, sc. 2.
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2004, Reed College.
Special thanks to Tobias Wolff, Frank Goodman, Seth Kreimer, Stacey Sobel, Colin Diver,
and especially David Conners.
2 Margaret Wente, From the Closet to the Altar, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 20, 2002, at
A15, quoted in James M. Donovan, Same-Sex Union Announcements: Whether Newspapers Must
Publish Them and Why We Should Care, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 721, 747 (2003).
3 See Dana Nelkin, Tradition and the Law: A Response to Wax, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1111,
1113 (2005) ("[R]ecent elections have shown that the majority-at least in many states-
is disinclined toward social change in th[e] area [of marriage].").
4 See D'Vera Cohn, Census Shows Big Increase in Gay Households, WASH. POST, June 20, 2001,
at Al (documenting the dramatic increase of openly gay and lesbian families).
5 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000) ("Indeed, it appears that homo-
sexuality has gained greater societal acceptance.").
6 "As of 2005, the Government Accounting Office had identified more than 1,000 [federal]
legal rights and responsibilities attendant to marriage.... States and localities have their
own marriage provisions." Dalton Conley, Op-Ed., Spread the Wealth of Spousal Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2007, at A13. Relationship equality has been described as "the last fron-
tier" of the gay rights movement. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & NAN D. HUNTER,
SExuALfTY, GENDER, AND THE LAw 1069 (2d ed. 2004).
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tures, the gay marriage movement has appealed to the courts, argu-
ing that equal protection and corollary state-constitutional principles"
entitle same-sex couples to the rights, and the title, of marriage.
Support for civil unions-granting gay couples the legal inci-
dences of marriage without its title-has emerged as a middle-
ground position in the raging marriage debate. The appeal of this
compromise position is its ability to accommodate the public's appar-
ently conflicting intuitions: beliefs that, on the one hand, gay people
are generally entitled to equal rights, and on the other hand, the so-
called traditional institution of marriage'0 ought to be confined to
7 Not counting those legislatures that have acted pursuant to a court order, only two legis-
latures in the country, in Connecticut and New Hampshire, have approved civil unions,
and only one legislature, in California, has approved gay marriage. See William Yardley,
Day Arrives for Recognition of Gay Unions in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at BI (dis-
cussing state action on gay marriage). Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the California
marriage statute and the state continues to have a domestic partnerships law that affords
many, but not all, of the rights of marriage. Id. A handful of other legislatures appear
poised to adopt civil union laws soon.
8 Many state constitutions guarantee equal protection through language different from
that in the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. I, § 20
(promulgating the equal privileges and immunities clause); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7
(promulgating the common benefits clause). See generally David Schuman, The Right to
"Equal Privileges and Immunities ": A State's Version of "Equal Protection," 13 VT. L. REV. 221
(1988). State courts have adopted a variety of tests, some very different from the U.S. Su-
preme Court's tiered scrutiny analysis, to implement their constitutions' equality guaran-
tee. See, e.g., Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 445 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (pro-
tecting gays under the State's equal privileges and immunities clause because they are a
"true class").
9 Not all states have called this legal construct a "civil union." See, e.g., H.B. 2007, 74th Reg.
Sess. § 9 (Or. 2007) (offering the full legal protections and entitlements of marriage
through "domestic partnerships"). Some states, including California, New York, Maine,
Hawaii, and Washington, as well as Washington, D.C., have created civil union-like institu-
tions called "domestic partnerships" that enumerate many, but not all, of the rights of
marriage to be extended to same-sex couples. Oregon has called its civil unions "domes-
tic partnerships" to make them more palateable to the public. See Byron Beck & Henry
Stern, Basic Rights Oregon and Rep. Tina Kotek, WILLAMETrE WK. (Or.), Apr. 18, 2007, avail-
able at http://wweek.com/editorial/3323/8833/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (explaining
the legislative name change).
10 I say "so-called traditional institution of marriage" because marriage has gone through a
dramatic evolution and no longer bears much resemblance to the many tradi-
tional/historical manifestations of that institution. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 966-67 (Mass. 2003) (discussing some of the enormous transformations
the institution of marriage has survived); see also Stephanie Coontz, 'Traditional' Marriage
Has Changed a Lot, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 23, 2006, at B7 (documenting the
dramatic changes in the history of marriage). It may not be unreasonable, therefore, to
conclude that institutional change is itself the "traditional" form. See Nelkin, supra note 3,
at 1114.
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opposite-sex relationships. First adopted the Vermont General As-
sembly at the direction of its State Supreme Court,' 2 the civil unions
alternative has earned support in the public,
13 in the political arena, 14
and most notably in some courts. 5 But same-sex marriage propo-
nents have objected to the civil unions alternative, arguing that full
equality under the law cannot be provided with a "separate but equal"
substitute for marriage.' 6
11 See PollingReport.com, Law and Civil Rights, http://vww.pollingreport.com/civil.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (identifying 89% support for equal employment rights for gays
(Gallup Poll, May 10-13, 2007) and 54% support for the proposition that homosexuality
should be considered an acceptable alternative lifestyle (Gallup Poll, May 8-11, 2006),
while only 46% support exists for legal recognition of same-sex marriages (Gallup Poll,
May 10-13, 2007)).
12 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886-88 (Vt. 1999) (requiring the Legislature to provide
equal benefits for gay and lesbian couples); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2007)
(providing for civil unions in the State of Vermont).
13 See PollingReport.com, supra note 11 (identifying 54% public support for non-marriage
gay unions (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Poll,July 6-19, 2006)).
14 Even President Bush, who has made opposition to gay marriage a centerpiece of his ad-
ministration's policy agenda, has expressed support for civil unions. Elisabeth Bumiller,
Bush Says His Party Is Wrong To Oppose Gay Civil Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A21.
15 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221-22 (N.J. 2006) (discussing civil unions as a possible
legislative remedy to the denial of equal protection to gays by the State's marriage stat-
utes); Li v. State, No. 0403-03057, 2004 WL 1258167, at *8 (Or. Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2004) ("It
is incumbent upon the legislature to evaluate the substantive rights afforded to married
couples and to provide similar access to same-sex domestic partners."), rev'd, 110 P.3d 91
(Or. 2005); Baker, 744 A.2d at 886-88 (requiring the legislature to adopt civil unions or
something similar at a minimum); Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215, at
*16 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2004) ("The question of creating different kinds of domes-
tic unions or partnerships is one for the Legislature."), revd sub nom. Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (en banc). But see In re Opinions of the Justices to the
Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 2004) (rejecting a legislative remedy establishing civil
unions rather than marriage for same-sex couples); Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d
579, 608-09 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (rejecting the civil unions remedy), rev'd, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y.
2006).
16 See David S. Buckel, Government Affixes a Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex Couples Vhen It Im-
poses Civil Unions & Denies Access to Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 73, 73-82 (2005)
(applying the repudiated "separate but equal" doctrine to the civil unions debate); see also
In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 569 ("The history of our nation
has demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal."). Not all gays and lesbians en-
dorse this view. Some argue that it does not matter what the institution is called as long
as the state provides equal rights, privileges, and responsibilities. See Kareem Fahim, In
New Jersey, Gay Couples Ponder Nuances of Measure To Allow Civil Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2006, at B1 ("It doesn't matter what you want to call it. If it will keep the heterosexual
people happy, let's just call it a union. Isn't that what a marriage is anyhow?" (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Some celebrate the different institution for its "queer" char-
acter. See Greg Johnson, In Praise of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 315, 339 (2002)
("Since civil unions are open only to same-sex couples, the lesbian and gay community
has a chance to 'own' it, to turn it into a viable and vibrant institution, and to be proud of
it."). And some recognize the incremental value of civil unions, arguing that civil unions
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The debate between proponents of civil unions and advocates of
full marriage recognition begins with the baseline that completely
denying relationship rights to same-sex couples violates the principle
of equal protection." Civil union proponents have articulated two
constitutional defenses for depriving gay couples of state-sanctioned
marriage. First, although there is no compelling reason to deprive
gay couples of the tangible benefits of marriage, they argue, there
might indeed be an overriding reason-be it tradition, institutional
stability, or something else-to deny gay couples the label "mar-
riage.""' Second, marriage stripped of its legal incidences is just a
name, civil union advocates argue, deprivation of which, without de-
nial of any measurable benefits, is not necessarily a problem of consti-
tutional magnitude.' 9 In other words, the equal protection analysis
never even gets going according to this view, because the classifica-
tion at issue is in name only. This Comment challenges the latter de-
fense, arguing that the title "marriage" is indeed a benefit of constitu-
tional magnitude, denial of which amounts to a facial deprivation of
equal protection.
The doctrine of equal protection requires that the state afford
similar treatment to similarly situated people. Since all laws make
provide equal rights for gays while keeping pace with the public's opposition to same-sex
marriage. See Editorial, Civil Unions: Jersey's Prudent Pace, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 11, 2006,
at A14 ("'Civil union' extends important legal rights to same-sex couples until society is
ready to accept more.").
17 This, by itself, is a controversial proposition. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel.
County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to recognize a con-
stitutional right to marry for same-sex couples); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding a bar on same-sex marriages); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at
12 (holding that a rational basis exists for limiting marriage to heterosexual couples);
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983-84 (upholding Washington's opposite-sex marriage law).
Nonetheless, this Comment presumes it as a baseline.
18 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 979-80 (Mass. 2003) (Sosman,J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the sociological novelty of same-sex marriage and the inconclu-
sive scientific evidence as to its effectiveness in childrearing provide a rational basis for a
ban on same-sex marriages); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 222 (referring to "reason[s] to justify re-
taining the definition of marriage solely for opposite sex couples" that might make the
classification constitutionally permissible). Perhaps the most creative reason for denying
marriage to same-sex couples was presented by New York's highest court, which asserted
that heterosexual couples need the "stability and permanence" of marriage more than
their gay and lesbian counterparts because straight relationships, which are more likely to
produce unintended children, "are all too often casual or temporary." Hernandez, 855
N.E.2d at 7.
19 See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 221-22 ("We will not presume that a difference in name alone is of
constitutional magnitude.").
20 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (discussing the re-
quirements of equal protection).
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classifications,2 the great weight of equal protection jurisprudence
identifies permissible classifications by determining whether the dis-
22similarly treated classes are similarly situated . Only in the rarest of
cases do a classification's defenders argue that the classification does
not amount to dissimilar treatment.23  But that is precisely the argu-
ment suggested by civil union proponents: the classification is in
name only, some say, since it does not "work to the actual disadvan-
tage of one class in some material way.,2 4 One court illustrated the
argument with this analogy: "the fact that two similar groups-men
and women, say-are referred to by two different names does not
provide the basis for an equal protection or due process challenge. '"
This Comment picks up the same-sex marriage discussion where
the scholarly literature and case law have left off. Much has been
written about the argument that statutory schemes denying marriage
• • 26
rights to same-sex couples are unconstitutional. The Supreme
21 See State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810, 816 (Or. 1981) ("[E]very law itself can be said to 'classify'
what it covers from what it excludes.").
22 See Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) ("The cases in this area all
involve an analysis of whether the government can justify treating one class of persons dif-
ferently from another."). The Court does this through a tiered scrutiny analysis, which
provides the least deference to legislative classifications based on criteria least likely to be
relevant to legitimate policy and to those classifications that regulate the most constitu-
tionally important institutions. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (explaining the court's equal protection cases).
23 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1967) (refuting the argument that anti-
miscegenation statutes are permissible because they apply equally to people of different
races); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (refuting the "separate but
equal" argument); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (upholding a law au-
thorizing separate accommodations by race).
24 Kerrigan, 909 A.2d at 99. This Comment does not develop a comprehensive account of
what amounts to a "material" classification-a classification of constitutional significance
under the Equal Protection Clause. It presumes that a material classification is one that
exhibits the following three indicia of materiality: objective importance, reasonable reli-
ance, and detriment. First, the basic test of materiality is whether a classification's "exis-
tence or nonexistence is a matter to which a reasonable man would attach importance."
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 538(2) (a) (1938); see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that materiality exists when "there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable [person] would consider it important"). The other two indi-
cia of materiality are, first, when a reasonable person is justified in relying on the classifi-
cation, see id. (discussing reasonable reliance as an element of materiality), and second,
when the classification "work[s] to the actual disadvantage of one class," Kerrigan, 909
A.2d at 99.
25 Kerrigan, 909 A.2d at 99.
26 See generally JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA (2004) (making a conservative argument for gay
marriage); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Many: Same-Sex Marriage
in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1184, 1207-31 (2004) (arguing that
Laurrence helps to pave the way for same-sex marriage); John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Ar-
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Courts of Massachusetts and New Jersey have begun an important
dialogue about the next step: When same-sex couples successfully
challenge a state's marriage laws, are civil unions an appropriate
remedy? 7  But the arguments in answer to this question are inade-
quately developed. This Comment aims to advance the dialogue by
proposing four distinct arguments for the constitutional significance
of the title "marriage."
It first develops, in Part I, the most commonly recited account for
marital recognition: although civil unions provide most of marriage's
"tangible benefits"-easily recognized, state-conferred rights and
privileges-they fail to provide marriage's intangible benefits, such as
esteem, self-definition, and the stabilizing influence of social expecta-
tions. Although these benefits may be less concrete than, say, tax ex-
emptions, they are no less constitutionally significant. Furthermore,
reviving the tangible-intangible distinction violates the equal protec-
tion principle announced in Brown v. Board of Education8 that "sepa-
rate but equal" institutions, especially those that brand a particular
class with a badge of inferiority, are inherently unequal.
Part II argues that state recognition is itself a tangible benefit
analogous to other government-conferred statuses, such as citizen-
ship or paternity/parentage. Because state recognition is a valuable
privilege that facilitates social understanding, denial of that benefit is
a deprivation of constitutional magnitude.
guments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1180-209 (1999) (arguing in
favor of same-sex marriage); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Essay, Comparative Law and the Same-
Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 McGEORGE L. REV.
641, 642 (2000) (predicting that conservative criticisms of same-sex marriage will not be
borne out in the long term, based on a comparative legal analysis); Pamela S. Katz, The
Case for Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 8J.L. & POL'Y 61, 84-104 (1999) (mounting
a thorough equal protection argument for recognition of same-sex marriages).
27 See In re Opinions of the justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 2004) (arguing
that civil unions deny equal protection to same-sex couples); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d
196, 226 (N.J. 2006) (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (addressing the societal and
emotional differences between civil unions and marriage). I excluded the Supreme
Court of Vermont's decision in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), because its discus-
sion of the civil unions remedy is brief and conclusory. See also David B. Cruz, "Just Don't
Call It Marriage" The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L.
REv. 925, 928-70 (2001) ("[I]n relegating same-sex couples to 'civil unions' while allow-
ing mixed-sex couples 'marriage,' the state denies same-sex couples the expressive poten-
tial of civil marriage ... in violation of First Amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech ... ."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lecture, Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the
Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 855-63 (2001) (analyzing civil unions as
an alternative to marriage).
28 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Part III argues that the title "marriage" is a constitutionally signifi-
cant benefit because it enables the denial of private-sector privileges
to civil-unioned couples. The doctrine of equal protection holds that
the government may not facilitate private acts of discrimination,
which is precisely what occurs when the state creates an inferior
status-the civil union-that is used in turn by non-state actors to
deny private-sector privileges to gay and lesbian couples. Much like a
state identification card, marriage is a government-issued key that
unlocks numerous private-sector benefits. Denial of access to this key
is therefore a constitutionally significant deprivation.
Finally, Part IV explores the constitutional significance of mar-
riage beyond the scope of equal protection. For many, marriage is a
religious rite performed by a member of the clergy; therefore, the
state's refusal to accord legitimacy to same-sex marriages lacks a secu-
lar purpose and amounts to an impermissible endorsement of relig-
ion under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.29
I. THE INTANGIBLE BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE
The most frequently articulated argument opposing civil unions
in the scholarly literature and case law is that restricting the title
"marriage" to opposite-sex couples denies gay families the "intangible
benefits of marriage. '0  In addition to the many legal incidences of
marriage-rights of inheritance, hospital visitation, child custody,
evidentiary privilege, and so on-marriage confers a constitutionally
significant status, producing a set of invisible privileges. The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court observed, "Civil marriage is at once a deeply
personal commitment to another human being and a highly public
celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidel-
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass. 2003) (listing some
"intangible" benefits of marriage, including "the enhanced approval that still attends the
status of being a marital child"); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 226 (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dis-
senting) ("By excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage, the State declares that it is
legitimate to differentiate between their commitments and the commitments of hetero-
sexual couples."); Graeme W. Austin, Essay: Family Law and Civil Union Partnerships-
Status, Contract and Access to Symbols, 37 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 183, 196 (2006)
("By denying same sex couples the ability to marry, the state withholds the full symbolic
significance of the term that can be invoked by and for heterosexual couples."); Tyler S.
Whitty, Comment, Eliminating the Exception? Lawrence v. Texas' and the Arguments for Ex-
tending the Right to Marry to Same-Sex Couples, 93 KY. L.J. 813, 816 (2005) ("Though it is not
often mentioned alongside the list of tangible benefits denied to same-sex couples, the
ability for two individuals to commit themselves to one another, especially in the eyes of
the public, is a very real benefit.").
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ity, and family. '  The court continued, "Because it fulfils yearnings
for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common
humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision
whether and whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of self-
definition."0
2
Policy analyst Jonathan Rauch casts the intangible benefits of mar-
riage in another light. A set of informal yet powerful rules and ex-
pectations accompany the legal institution of marriage, a "hidden
law" as he calls it, composed of "norms, conventions, implicit bar-
gains, and folk wisdoms that organize social expectations, regulate
everyday behavior, and manage interpersonal conflicts." 3  Because
"[t] he institution of marriage offers structural and cultural support to
heterosexual partners[,] the denial of marriage to gay couples de-
prives them of this support. 3 4 Thus, barring same-sex couples from
the opportunity to enter a marriage, with all of its associated social
35rules and expectations, robs gay families 3 of the resulting stability
that their heterosexual counterparts enjoy.' 6
31 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
32 Id. at 955.
33 Jonathan Rauch, Conventional Wisdom: Rediscovering the Social Norms that Stand Between Law
and Libertianism, REASON, Feb. 2000, at 37; see also Cruz, supra note 27, at 933 ("Marital
commitment is expressed not simply by ceremonies, rings, and gifts. It is also expressed
by the act of undertaking and continuing to live under the responsibilities of civil mar-
riage, and by letting it be known that one is living as a part of a civil marriage."). Even
same-sex marriage opponents recognize the power of these social expectations in creat-
ing marital and familial stability. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995 (Cordy,J., dissent-
ing) ("The partners in a marriage are expected to engage in exclusive sexual relations,
with children the probable result.... ."); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y.
2006) (arguing that one rational basis for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is
their greater need for its stabilizing influences).
34 M. D. A. Freeman, Not Such a Queer Idea: Is There a Case for Same Sex Marriages?, 16 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 1, 12-13 (1999).
35 I say "gay families" because the children of same-sex couples also benefit from state rec-
ognition and the stability and expectations that result from it. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at
956-57 ("[C]hildren are also directly or indirectly, but no less auspiciously, the recipients
of the special legal and economic protections obtained by civil marriage.... [Tihe fact
remains that marital children reap a measure of family stability.., based on their par-
ents' legally privileged status that is largely inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to
nonmarital children."); Keith M. Phaneuf, Same-Sex Marriage Debate Heats Up, J. INQUIRER
(North Manchester, Conn.), Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.journalinquirer.com/
site/printerFriendly.cfm?brd=985&dept_id=161556&newsid=17793916 ("But unlike many
Connecticut families, we don't have the dignity and respect for our relationship and our
children that society bestows on married heterosexual couples.").
36 In his book, Rauch criticizes gay marriage opponents for citing statistics purporting to
demonstrate the instability of same-sex relationships. He argues that if marriage-with its
associated social rules and expectations-facilitates stability, then a population excluded
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While the intangible benefits of marriage may be significant, civil
union proponents have doubted whether they rise to constitutional
importance. 37 Two arguments indicate that they do. First, it is these
intangible qualities, and not marriage's instrumental purposes, that
the Supreme Court has emphasized as most relevant to marriage's
constitutional status as a fundamental right. And second, regarding
these intangible benefits as de minimis gives judicial sanction to a
"separate but equal" regime, impermissible under the Supreme
Court's equal protection cases.
A. Intangible Benefits as Central to the Fundamental Right of Marriage
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held marriage to be a funda-
mental constitutional right.3 To justify, analyze, and apply this right,
the Court has focused on its intangible benefits over its instrumental
purposes. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court defended the inviola-
bility of the marital relationship from intrusion by the State, describ-
ing marriage as "a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an asso-
ciation that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social pro-
jects.,,39  In Zablocki v. Redhail,40 by identifying marriage as a funda-
mental right, the Court held that the Constitution protected "some-
thing less tangible [than living together and having children] and
more important: the values of self-identification and commitment."'
The Court later endorsed an inmate's right to get married in
Turner v. Safley, describing marriage as an "expression [] of emotional
from marriage may understandably have more unstable relationships than those permit-
ted to reap its benefits. See RAUCH, supra note 26, at 147-48.
37 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 222 (N.J. 2006) ("We will not presume that a difference
in name alone is of constitutional magnitude.").
38 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) ("[T]he right to marry is of funda-
mental importance...."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of
the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." (quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))).
39 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
40 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
41 Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 670 (1980). Appli-
cation of Zablocki to same-sex marriage is not far-fetched; in fact, Justice Powell foresaw
the application in his opinion concurring in judgment. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 399
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("State regulation has included bans on incest, big-
amy, and homosexuality, as well as various preconditions to marriage, such as blood
tests.... A 'compelling state purpose' inquiry would cast doubt on the network of restric-
tions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage and divorce.").
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support and public commitment. These elements are an important
and significant aspect of the marital relationship ... as an expression
of personal dedication., 42  Turner presents a useful parallel insofar as
the State sought to deny inmates the right to wed, similar in structure
to the State's denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples. In each
of the above-mentioned cases, the Court notably identified the intan-
gible benefits flowing from the title "marriage," not the associated
state-conferred benefits, as constitutionally significant.
Not only in Supreme Court dicta does our law hold the instru-
mental aspects of marriage to be of secondary importance to its in-
tangible value. Someone who marries simply for instrumental rea-
sons, such as helping a friend immigrate legally into the United
States, is engaging in "marriage fraud" under federal law.43  "By
prosecuting such marriages, government insists on a tighter connec-
tion between civil marriage and the affect and commitment thought
to justify marriage."04 The essence of marriage, American law holds,
is its non-instrumental, intangible qualities.
Far from being a de minimis equal protection consideration, mar-
riage's non-instrumental purposes are central to its constitutional
significance. Inequitably denying the right to marry-and its associ-
ated intangible benefits-might properly subject the classification to
strict scrutiny;"5 at a minimum, however, the intangible benefits of
marriage are constitutionally significant.
42 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Chowdhury, 169 F.3d 402, 405-07 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding
conviction for marriage fraud for the purpose of violating immigration laws).
44 Cruz, supra note 27, at 940.
45 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-87 (citing procreation, family relationships, childrearing and
education, and marital privacy as essential aspects of the marital relationship, giving rise
to strict scrutiny); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (requiring strict scrutiny for interference in "the basic civil rights of man"-the
right to marry and procreate). Predictably, post-Lawrence courts have been reluctant to
review anti-gay classifications with heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d
808, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 575 (2005); Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-17 (11th Cir. 2004). But see United States v.
Marcum, 60 MJ. 198, 205-07 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (recognizing that Lawrence requires some
sort of heightened scrutiny); Evangelos Kostoulas, Comment, Ask, Tell, and Be Merry: The
Constitutionality of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Following Lawrence v. Texas and United States v.
Marcum, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 565, 578-80, 585-87 (2007) (arguing that gays are entitled
to heightened scrutiny after Lawrence). Although it is hard to imagine a court today ap-
plying anything more rigorous than rational basis scrutiny, there should be no doubt that,
at a minimum, the intangible benefits of marriage warrant constitutional inquiry.
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B. "Separate but Equal"
Rationalizing the deprivation of "intangible benefits" as being
constitutionally insignificant is not a new theme in equal protection
discourse. The Supreme Court sought to end this distinction in
Brown v. Board of Education. Regarding intangible benefits as de
minimis gives judicial sanction to a "separate but equal" regime, im-
permissible under the Supreme Court's equal protection cases.47 At
issue in Brown was whether racially segregated schools could satisfy
equal protection scrutiny, even when the parties stipulated that the
tangible resources afforded to black and white schools were equal.46
In fact, the resources afforded to racially segregated schools in the
Brown era were not equal, but plaintiffs stipulated this point to force
the Court to reconsider the "separate but equal" doctrine 49 it had
pronounced in Plessy v. Ferguson."° Making explicit the problem that
the Brown plaintiffs had set out to remedy, the District Court in Brown
found that "[s]egregation of white and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children[,]""' but
nonetheless upheld the segregation scheme on the grounds that "the
separate but equal rule [of Plessy] required equality only in the physi-
cal characteristics of buildings, equipment, the curricula, quality of
instruction, and other tangible features of the school system. ' 2 Brown
represents a turning point precisely because the Supreme Court
abandoned this specious tangible-intangible distinction in its equal
protection jurisprudence. After Brown, the Equal Protection Clause
46 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible'factors may be equal, deprive
the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it
does." (emphasis added)).
47 See Buckel, supra note 16, at 74-76.
48 See Paul E. Wilson, The Genesis of Brown v. Board of Education, 6 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7,
17 (1996) ("[The parties stipulated] that the same course of study and school textbooks
were employed at both black and white schools, and that teacher qualifications, play su-
pervision, health services, and other extra-classroom services supplied to white and col-
ored schools were of the same quality and extent.").
49 SeeJohn Hart Ely, If at First You Don't Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group Harm in
Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 222 n.19
(1998) (discussing the historical background).
50 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
51 Wilson, supra note 48, at 20 (quoting Transcript of Record at 245, Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (Civ. No. T-316), rev'd, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
52 Id.
53 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 ("Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison
of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We
must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.").
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reached not only textbooks and facilities, but intangible deprivations
as well.
Brown's rejection of the tangible-intangible distinction was not just
a doctrinal flash in the pan. Four years earlier, the Court laid the
foundation for Brown in Sweatt v. Painter, when it held that Texas
could not justify the all-white admission policy of its leading state law
school on the ground that blacks could attend another inferior law
school.54 In addition to the all-black school's less accomplished fac-
ulty, fewer courses, and substandard resources, the Court cited "those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for [academic] greatness" 55-the school's "standing in the
community, traditions and prestige"56-as reasons for invalidating the
State's practice of segregation in its law schools. In recent years, the
Court has renewed its commitment to the constitutional significance
of intangible benefits. In United States v. Virginia, citing Sweatt, the
Court struck down the Virginia Military Academy's men-only admis-
sion policy, because, inter alia, the women-only alternative school de-
nied its graduates "the benefits associated with [Virginia Military
Academy] 's 157-year history, the school's prestige, and its influential
alumni network. ',57 The Court added, "[C]lassifications may not be
used ... to create or perpetuate.., social... inferiority .... "58 The
Court's rejection of the tangible-intangible distinction has been con-
sistent in the generations since Brown, extending even to standing
doctrine. 59
The doctrinal parallels between segregation and civil unions, if
not the severity of the abuses at issue, 60 are striking. The civil union,
54 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
55 Id. at 634.
56 Id.
57 518 U.S. 515, 551 (1996). Interestingly, in his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist
joined the Court's majority in affirming the constitutional significance of these intangible
factors. See id. at 563 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in judgment) (citing Virginia Military
Academy's "history and tradition").
58 Id. at 534 (majority opinion).
59 [T]he right to equal treatment guaranteed by the Constitution is not co-extensive
with any substantive rights to the benefits denied the party discriminated against.
Rather, as we have repeatedly emphasized, discrimination itself, by perpetuating
"archaic and stereotypic notions" or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored
group as "innately inferior" and therefore as less worthy participants in the politi-
cal community, can cause serious noneconomic injuries to those persons who are
personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfa-
vored group.
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984) (citation omitted).
60 Eskridge rightly points out that factual comparisons between the substantive inequalities
for gays denied the right to marry and for African Americans living in the segregated
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like the segregated black school, is a separate institution that pur-
ports to offer the same substantive provisions as its preferred, but in-
accessible, counterpart. 6' Those relegated to the less desirable insti-
tution62 are deprived not of tangible benefits, but of esteem; they are
branded with "inferiority as to their status in the community. 63 In
both cases, a class is relegated to the less desirable institution by vir-
tue of its disfavored status. 64
South are inapt, since the plight of African Americans living underJim Crow was so much
more severe. See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 870; see alsoJohnson, supra note 16, at 332-33
(arguing that comparing civil unions to segregation is an unfair comparison); accord Lynn
D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L.
REV. 1, 75-88 (criticizing analogies between race discrimination and civil unions). In an
equal protection context, however, the doctrinal comparisons are illuminating.
61 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31 (West 2006) ("Civil union couples shall have all of the
same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from stat-
ute, administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any other source of civil
law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.").
62 See generally David L. Chambers, The Baker Case, Civil Unions, and the Recognition of Our
Common Humanity: An Introduction and a Speculation, 25 VT. L. REV. 5, 12 (2000) (arguing
that policymakers who adopted civil unions in Vermont "really do think that gay relation-
ships are different from theirs and, though worthy, not quite equal"); Tina Kelley, Couples
Not Rushing to Civil Unions in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at BI (attributing the
surprisingly low number of same-sex couples who applied for civil union licenses in their
first month of availability to the sense that civil unions are inferior to marriage).
63 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'[Preserving the traditional institution of marriage'
is just a kinder way of describing the State's moral disapproval of same-sex couples.");
Halpern v. Att'y Gen. of Canada, [2003] 215 D.L.R.4th 223, 1 107 (Can.) ("Exclusion
perpetuates the view that same-sex relationships are less worthy of recognition than oppo-
site-sex relationships. In doing so, it offends the dignity of persons in same-sex relation-
ships."), affd 225 D.L.R.4th 529 (Can.), available at http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/
decisions/2003/june/halpernC39172.htm; Robert Schwaneberg, Gay Couples Find Obsta-
cles on Benefits, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 15, 2007, at 21 ("In the employment sec-
tor in particular, folks don't understand civil unions, and then when they come to under-
stand what they are they find ways to disrespect them .... After all, the state has said that
these relationships aren't worthy of marriage." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Leg-
islators voting in favor of civil union legislation acknowledge that they are setting up an
inferior institution. See, e.g., Audio file: House Debate on the Oregon Family Fairness
Act, H.B. 2007, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007), at 55:00 (Apr. 17, 2007) (state-
ment of Rep. Chip Shields), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/cgi-bin/listarchives.
cgi?archive.2007s&HOUSE&+House+Chamber+Sessions ("Let's be clear: this is not
equality, not even close.... Couples who obtain a domestic partnership will not have
what is truly equal, access to the full equality of marriage itself.... And I say to you col-
leagues, to me it is sad-sad that we are setting up a system of inequality in the name of
furthering equality.").
64 See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 861 ("[E]ach regime acquiesces in tradition-based distinc-
tions that connote second-class citizenship for the historically subordinated group.").
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Importantly, Brown is not distinguishable, as some have argued, on
the ground that civil unions impose a "rhetorical separation, 6" while
Jim Crow segregation imposed "physical separation."" This observa-
tion identifies a distinction without a difference. The equal protec-
tion claim in Brown arose from the badge of inferiority imposed by
segregated institutions.67  Whether the badge of inferiority was the
product of a physical or symbolic separation is incidental to the equal
protection rationale. Brown is also not distinguishable on the ground
that African Americans are a suspect class while gays are not, since
the Court did not engage in a tiered scrutiny analysis in Brown. 6  Al-
though gays do not enjoy the protection of heightened scrutiny,6 the
Supreme Court's cases are concerned with state action branding
them as inferior. Romer v. Evans held that the law may not "singl[e]
out [homosexuals] for disfavored legal status,' '0 nor may it "classif[y]
homosexuals ... to make them unequal to everyone else."' Lawrence
v. Texas7 1 spoke in even bolder terms. Citing the "stigma 7 3 imposed
on homosexuals by sodomy statutes, the Court insisted, "The State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny .... ,7 The
Court described same-sex relationships as intimate, an enduring per-
sonal bond, and essential to the dignity of homosexuals as free per-
sons. 75 "Taken together... [Romer and Lawrence] mean[] that gov-
ernment may not demean the lives of gay persons by... treat[ing]
65 Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 100 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (emphasis omitted) (arguing
that civil unions impose a rhetorical separation, rather than a physical separation, which
is not sufficient to trigger due process analysis).
66 Id. at 99 (emphasis omitted). Physical separation remains an important policy concern,
but is not necessarily a constitutional matter. Accord Benjamin P. O'Glasser, Comment,
Constitutional, Political, and Philosophical Struggle: Measure 37 and the Oregon Urban Growth
Boundary Controversy, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 595, 627 (2007) (discussing the economic seg-
regation that has resulted from urban flight and the advantages of reintegration).
67 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (discussing how segregated educational facilities brand African
Americans with a badge of inferiority).
68 In re Opinions of the justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 n.3 (Mass. 2004).
69 See Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 175 (2003) (describing the level of scrutiny applied to classi-
fications based on sexual orientation as "rational review with bite"); see also supra note 45.
70 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
71 Id. at 635.
72 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
73 Id. at 575.
74 Id. at 578.
75 Id. at 567.
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them as a separate, secondary class. ' '76 This concern for the dignity
and equal status of gays and lesbians is consistent with the Court's his-
torical condemnation of state action that brands minorities with a
badge of inferiority."
The intangible benefits of marriage are indeed considerations of
constitutional magnitude, just as the intangible benefits of racially in-
tegrated education were constitutionally relevant a half century ago.
Excluding gay couples from marriage, even while creating a parallel
structure giving them all the instrumental benefits of marriage, of-
fends the principle of equal protection by communicating that gays
are disfavored and that their relationships are less valuable than those
of their straight counterparts.
II. RECOGNITION AS A TANGIBLE BENEFIT
Relying on the function of the civil union as an institution degrad-
ing to gay and lesbian couples may not be necessary in mounting a
facial equal protection claim, however. The "separate but equal" ar-
gument, discussed above, seeks to discredit the tangible-intangible
distinction in equal protection jurisprudence. But if state recogni-
tion is itself a "tangible benefit," then depriving same-sex couples of
that recognition gives rise to an equal protection claim.
When a couple weds in the eyes of the law, the two individuals are
entitled to a litany of rights and privileges, one of which is official
recognition by the state that they are a married unit. But "civil un-
ion[] law[s] forthrightly concede[] that [they] 'do[] not bestow the
status of civil marriage' on same-sex couples, 79 thereby denying to
gays and their children the constitutionally significant privilege of
state recognition. Some courts have belittled the benefit of state rec-
ognition as merely a "symbolic benefit, [providing gay couples noth-
76 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Cook v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-2313 (lst Cir. Nov. 13,
2006), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDNARTICLES/pdf-file/3310.
pdf.
77 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (striking down a statute bar-
fing African Americans from juries on the ground that the law was "an assertion of their
inferiority").
78 See Cruz, supra note 27, at 939 (discussing the importance of the "the formal legal status
of being civilly married" to the construction of identity); see also HCJ 721/94 El-Al Isr. Air-
lines, Ltd. v. Danielowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749 (Kedmi, J., dissenting), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/fileseng/94/210/007/zOl/94007210.zOl.htm ("'[M]arriage'
is what grants legal-and social-recognition to the joint life of the 'spouses' as a family
unit....").
79 Eskridge, supra note 27, at 859 (citing An Act Relating to Civil Unions, H.B. 847, 1999
Gen. Assem., Adjourned Sess., § 1(10) (Vt. 1999)).
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ing more than the] moral satisfaction[] of seeing their relationships
recognized by the State." s A state-conferred status is not of negligible
importance, however, because individuals experience a government-
issued status in much the same way they experience any other mate-
rial benefit."'
When the government grants citizenship or declares paternity, the
status it bestows can be as important as the associated legal benefits.
Imagine if in response to growing Hispanic immigration into the
United States and an accompanying surge in American nativism, the
government barred Hispanics from gaining American citizenship, but
granted to those who would otherwise qualify for citizenship an alter-
native status-say, "domestic inhabitant"-offering all of the substan-
tive rights and privileges of citizenship without the title . This strikes
one as intuitively inequitable because the right to call one's self a citi-
zen and to be recognized as such by the government is significant.
s3
Depriving a class of people recognition as citizens, even if its mem-
bers possess all other incidences of citizenship, would be experienced
as deprivation equal in magnitude to the withholding of material
benefits. 4
80 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
81 See infra notes 83, 85, 86.
82 William Eskridge offered a similar hypothetical, analogizing the civil unions of today to a
marriage-like institution that could have been created for interracial couples in the civil
rights era. See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 870-71.
83 See Ediberto Roman, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557, 572 (2006) ("[T]he
,membership facet' of citizenship [is] the sense of belonging and participation in the na-
tional community... demonstrat[ing] a psychological component of citizen-
ship .... [T]he anointment of citizenship is an important title that goes to the heart of
the individual's feeling of inclusion as well as the collective citizenry's sense of the value
and virtue of the democracy." (citation omitted)). Naturalization accounts confirm the
importance of government recognition as equally or more important than the practical
benefits of citizenship. Reflecting the importance of citizenship-as-identity, one newly
naturalized citizen cheered, "I've been born again as an American citizen," Celia W. Dug-
ger, In Surge to Be Americans, Thousands Take Oath, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1997, at 1 (internal
quotation marks omitted). When one newly naturalized citizen was "[a]sked what bene-
fits he believed came with citizenship, [he] replied, 'Not a lot.' 'You can apply for federal
jobs,' he said. 'That's about it.'" Edward Wong, Swift Road for U.S. Citizen Soldiers Already
Fighting in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2005, at Al1. In fact, many naturalized citizens choose
not to vote, suggesting that people become citizens for the status it confers rather than
the associated legal benefits. SeeJune Kronholz, Uphill Climb: Registering Hispanics to Vote,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2006, at A4 (discussing the low numbers of naturalized Hispanics
who actually vote).
84 One might rebut this analogy by arguing that Hispanics are a suspect class, thus making
the deprivation of citizenship status unconstitutional for failing to survive strict scrutiny.
At issue in the present analysis, however, is whether recognition is a benefit of constitu-
tional magnitude giving rise to a facial equal protection claim. See Lewis v. Harris, 908
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Declarations of paternity and parentage are similarly important
state-conferred statuses. When an unmarried father sues a hostile
mother for paternity, he seeks both the rights of a parent-usually,
custodial rights-and recognition from the state that he is the fa-
ther.s" When adoptive parents establish parentage, they too seek a
combination of rights and recognition. If the state were to grant a
disfavored class of people (the disabled, for example) the rights of
paternity/parentage without the associated declaration of status oth-
ers receive, members of this class would experience a constitutionally
significant inequality.
8 6
The importance of government recognition in the area of mar-
riage is not easily overstated. State recognition is an essential part of
the traditional marriage ceremony script-"By the power vested in
me by the State of. .. ."-representing the state's legitimization of
the union. Recognition is so important that at common law a cou-
A.2d 196, 221-22 (NJ. 2006). One only reaches the issue of tiered scrutiny once the fa-
cial case has been made.
85 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 148 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("What [the putative father] wants is a chance to show that he is [the child's] father."); id.
at 161 (WhiteJ., dissenting) (discussing the putative father's "interest in establishing that
he is the father of the child"); Gay Man Wins Right to Call Girl His Daughter, ROCKY MNT.
NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Nov. 20, 1994, at 94A (describing a court's declaration of paternity
as winning the right "[to] call [one]self the father of the girl").
86 A third illustration is provided by states that permit postoperative transsexuals to change
the sex on their birth certificates. See, e.g., M. T. v.J. T., 355 A.2d 204, 210-11 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976) (favoring full legal recognition of the transsexual as his or her post-
operative sex). Although a tangible legal benefit resulting from this change is the trans-
sexual's right to marry someone of his or her birth sex, the primary motivation for secur-
ing a birth certificate change is the value of state recognition to the transsexual's identity.
See Saru Matambanadzo, Engendering Sex: Birth Certificates, Biology and the Body in Anglo
American Law, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 213, 245 (2005) ("[L]egal sex mat-
ters... [because] it provides the basic framework of existence for individuals."). Indeed,
for transsexuals who wish to partner with someone who shares their postoperative gen-
der, there is no prospect of legal marriage in most states. Still, many pursue the birth cer-
tificate change for its importance to their identity. As with citizenship and pater-
nity/parentage, if the state denied a subclass of postoperative transsexuals-say, those
who are left-handed-the fight to change their birth certificates, this would presumably
give rise to a facial equal protection claim.
87 "[W]e both were profoundly moved when the marriage commissioner said, 'By the power
vested in me by the province of British Columbia, I now pronounce you wife and wife.' It
was another transformative moment that solidified our foundation.... [O]ur marriage is
strengthened by legal recognition in Canada...." BarbaraJ. Rhoads-Weaver & Heather
E. Rhoads-Weaver, In the Pursuit of Happiness: One Lesbian Couple's Thoughts on Marriage, 2
SEAIrLEJ. FOR Soc. JUST. 539, 544 (2004); see a/soJohnson, supra note 16 ("[W]hen you
go into a ceremony and hear ajustice (of the peace) say, 'By the power vested in me,' it
truly was the most joyous experience I'd ever had." (quoting David Mace, A Year with Civil
Unions, TIMESARGUS (Montpelier, Vt.),July 1, 2001)).
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pie whose marriage was solemnized by the state was considered a le-
gal unit, no longer individuals,"8 a tradition whose imprint lingers to-
day through such legal entitlements as the marital privilege. 9 One
article, written jointly by a lesbian couple, bemoaned that "[t]he
law... forces us to operate in a system that will only recognize each
of us as individuals, rather than acknowledging and protecting our
desired status as unified individuals. ''90
Recognition is also valuable inasmuch as it facilitates an under-
standing of the relationship by others, providing the language and
context in which to situate same-sex couples.9' To family members,
acquaintances, colleagues, and passing associates, a same-sex relation-
ship not solemnized as a marriage may seem more like cohabitating
friends or elderly sisters who provide care for one another than a
marriage.92  One couple reported "shar[ing] many years together,
and already celebrat[ing] a purely religious union ceremony, but
only after they participated in a ceremony of potential legal signifi-
cance did their family begin to take them seriously as a couple."93
Some couples have even resorted to changing last names to provide
some ritual-legal context for others to comprehend their transforma-
tion from single to "married.0
4
Perhaps the greatest beneficiaries of state recognition are the
children of same-sex couples. 5 Children must interact with adults-
88 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (explaining that at common law
"husband and wife were one").
89 See id. at 44-45 (exploring the origins of the current legal privilege of marriage in com-
mon law).
90 Rhoads-Weaver & Rhoads-Weaver, supra note 87, at 542.
91 See id. ("[T]he absence of legal recognition makes it more difficult for those in our family
and community to understand... our marriage.")
92 Some domestic partnership legislative proposals provide marriage-like rights to any two
people who register with the state, including elderly sisters and cohabitating friends, con-
flating these different types of relationships in the eyes of the state. See, e.g., Michelle
Cole, Benefits Bill Follows Measure 36, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), May 29, 2005, at B01
(describing a reciprocal benefits scheme); see also Beccah Golubock Watson, Beyond Mar-
riage: Love and the Law, NATION, Jan. 29, 2007, available at http://www.thenation.com/
doc/20070212/watson (discussing the extension of marriage benefits by contrasting mar-
riage with non-traditional partnerships, like same-sex couples and families or friends with
integrated finances, and asserting that "[p]artnerships like these, rather than marriage,
hold many American families together" (emphasis added)).
93 Donovan, supra note 2, at 749.
94 See Rhoads-Weaver & Rhoads-Weaver, supra note 87, at 543 ("The impact that legally
changing her name had on Heather underscores the impact that the legal recognition of
a marriage has on a couple. By changing her name, Heather's colleagues understood
that she had married.").
95 See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *8 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
("[C]hildren of same-sex couples would be helped if their families received the social
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in particular, teachers and peers' parents-who do not understand
their same-sex parents' relationship. If it is difficult for adults to
comprehend the civil union relationship, it must be all the more dif-
ficult for the peers of same-sex couples' children to understand a
family structure that lacks the government-conferred status of mar-
96riage .
Civil unions, it is true, do provide some type of state recognition.97
But the state is decidedly not recognizing the couple as "married,,
98
denying both the self-identification value and the cultural context of
marriage. The government recognition provided by a civil union is
inferior to that provided by a marriage,99 and therein lies the equal
protection claim. It is a basic canon of constitutional law "that there
should be a remedy for every wrong."100  When the state withholds
recognition from a disfavored class-be it citizenship, pater-
nity/parentage, sex, 10 1 or marital status-the denial of recognition is
experienced as a wrong by members of that class. Because recogni-
tion of status is experienced as a material benefit, denial of this bene-
fit is therefore a deprivation of constitutional magnitude sufficient to
mount a facial equal protection claim.
status derived from marriage."); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956-
57 (Mass. 2003) ("[C]hildren are also directly or indirectly, but no less auspiciously, the
recipients of the special legal and economic protections obtained by civil mar-
riage.... Some of these benefits are social, such as the enhanced approval that still at-
tends the status of being a marital child.").
96 One civil-unioned parent complained that he "does not want [his son] to have to explain
to anyone who asks that what his parents have is something like a marriage... [or] al-
most a marriage." Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health,
S.C. 17716 (Conn. Nov. 22, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://
www.glad.org/marriage/Kerrigan-Mock/Kerrigan-%20SupremeCourt_Final.pdf.
97 SeeJohnson, supra note 16, at 339 (arguing that civil unions afford gays a unique type of
recognition, separate from marriage).
98 See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 860 (observing that civil union laws pointedly withhold
marriage from same-sex couples).
99 See Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 479 (App. Div. 2005) ("[T]he Ver-
mont Legislature went to great pains to expressly decline to place civil unions and mar-
riage on an identical basis.... The import of that action is of no small moment."); Ray
Henry, Gay Marriage About Strategy, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY (N.J.), Mar. 18, 2007, at G7
("Even though civil unions and individual laws can grant gay couples some protection,
lawmakers who support them are deliberately setting up a lesser system ....").
100 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 54 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
101 See supra note 86.
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III. THE PRIVATE-SECTOR PRIVILEGES RESERVED FOR MARRIAGE
In addition to conferring a status important to the self-definition
of same-sex couples and facilitating public understanding of their re-
lationships, government recognition enables important private-sector
benefits. Many privileges in the private sector are available only to
married spouses, at the exclusion of same-sex civil-unioned partners.
These private-sector privileges are an equal protection concern for
two reasons. First, the principle of equal protection dictates that the
law may not facilitate systematic private acts of discrimination.' 2 Sec-
ond, one public benefit of marriage is the key it provides to unlock
private privileges. Although private acts of discrimination are them-
selves beyond the reach of the Equal Protection Clause,13 the public
decree enabling citizens to employ these private privileges is not.
Countless benefits, privileges, and opportunities are available to
married couples in the private sector that are not available to their
civil-unioned counterparts. °4 Gay couples often struggle to share pri-
102 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622-24 (1991) (striking down ra-
cially motivated peremptory challenges in civil cases because the discrimination is facili-
tated by the court); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.").
103 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-73 (1972) (holding that a private
club's discriminatory admission policy was outside the Equal Protection Clause's reach,
yet barring any state enforcement).
104 Some of these distinctions are remedied with state antidiscrimination laws protecting
gays, or by laws specifically requiring equal provisions, like employment benefits, for
parmered employees. See, e.g., Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West
2007) (requiring equal treatment of gays and lesbians in the private sector). But many
states do not have antidiscrimination laws protecting gays. See Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and
Transgender Americans and State Legislation, EQUALITY FROM ST. TO ST. (Human Rights
Campaign Found., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2006, at 15, available at http://www.hrc.org/
documents/StateToState2007.pdf (reporting that only 17 states have antidiscrimination
laws protecting gays). Even those state laws that do protect gays from private discrimina-
tion do not address all of the private-sector inequalities between married and civil union
couples. See Bill Graves, Decades in Making Gay-Rights Law Passes, OREGONIAN (Portland,
Or.), Apr. 20, 2007, at A01 (discussing a broad exemption to the state's anti-
discrimination law that allows sexual orientation discrimination by religiously affiliated
churches, hospitals, schools, camps, day-care centers, thrift stores, bookstores, radio sta-
tions, shelters, and other institutions). Even in cases covered by these laws, many private
actors persist in refusing to recognize civil-unioned couples as married and therefore de-
cline to extend equal benefits as a result. See Kelley, supra note 62, at BI ("'Hospitals, em-
ployers and other institutions will say, 'We don't care what the law says, you are not mar-
fied,' ..... The word is starting to spread that the civil union law is in fact not working to
provide couples with the protection that only the word marriage can.'" (quoting Steven
Goldstein, Chairman of Garden State Equality)).
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vate employment benefits.'05 Some academic institutions fail to pro-
vide spousal healthcare to civil-unioned students, while married stu-
dents acquire spousal coverage as a matter of course. 0 6 Some land-
lords rent only to married couples. 10 7 Some hospitals allow visitation
privileges only to married couples. Some private adoption agencies
preference married over non-married couples in placing children.'0 8
Some insurance companies fail to provide equal benefits to civil-
unioned couples, for example, declining to continue coverage for a
gay partner when his insured spouse dies. 09 The list of private-sector
privileges includes countless relatively trivial items as well, such as
newspapers that print wedding announcements only for couples en-
tering a state-recognized marriage."0  A recent report by the NewJer-
sey Civil Union Commission, issued on the one year anniversary of
the State's civil union law, confirms that private actors such as em-
ployers and officials at hospitals and banks treat civil-unioned couples
unequally "not because of an objection to the government recogni-
105 Numerous complaints have been filed with gay rights organizations for the failure of em-
ployers to provide spousal benefits to civil-unioned couples. See Schwaneberg, supra note
63, at 21 (documenting couples who have failed to receive benefits). One expert ob-
served, "In the employment sector in particular, folks don't understand civil unions, and
then when they come to understand what they are they find ways to disrespect
them .... After all, the state has said that these relationships aren't worthy of marriage."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). One resistant employer explained, "We're sub-
ject to federal law .... Our understanding is we would not have to change our eligibility
at this time to cover civil unions... ." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Rhoads-Weaver & Rhoads-Weaver, supra note 87, at 544 (discussing the difficulty in secur-
ing employment benefits); accord Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180, 194 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1998) (upholding a city initiative barring registered domestic partners from receiv-
ing public-sector employment benefits like healthcare).
106 See Rhoads-Weaver & Rhoads-Weaver, supra note 87, at 545 (noting that this affected the
couple when one attended law school).
107 See generally Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, Nos.
04-56916, 04-57173, 2008 WL 879293 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2008) (discussing sexual orienta-
tion discrimination in housing).
108 In fact, some states have pushed formally to grant legal permission for these discrimina-
tory adoption-placement practices. See, e.g., H.B. 5908 & 5909, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2006) (permitting discrimination based on a placement agency's expressed "reli-
gious or moral convictions").
109 See Geoff Mulvihill, Civil Unions Won't Have Full Benefits of Marriage-Federal Law, Insurance
Provisions Are Among Obstacles for Gay Couples, REC. (Hackensack, NJ.), Dec. 17, 2006, at
A03 (discussing insurance inequality).
110 See Marylynne Pitz, Glaad Tidings--Alliance Campaigns for Newspapers to Announce Gay En-
gagements, Civil Unions, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETtE, Jan. 23, 2007, at C1 (explaining that
many newspapers do not publish same-sex engagement and civil union announcements);
Donovan, supra note 2, at 733-40 (discussing same-sex wedding announcements).
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tion of same-sex couples, but because of the term used by the stat-
,,111
utes. .... "
A. Giving Effect to Private Biases
A traditional equal protection inquiry would end with the observa-
tion that these inequitable classifications are undertaken by private
actors, not the state. But while "[p]rivate biases may be outside the
reach of the law,... the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect." 12 The private discriminations described above are facilitated
and supported by the designations "marriage" and "civil union" con-
structed and maintained by state law. 113  Private actors could not ex-
press a preference for married over civil-unioned couples if the dis-
tinction did not exist. The state therefore cultivates and perpetuates
the impression that "traditional marriages" are preferable to civil un-
ions by relegating gay couples to the less-favored status; 1 4 it then fa-
cilitates the discrimination by imposing a distinction of law that is, in
turn, used by private actors to discriminate."'
In addition to the long list of private-sector benefits denied to
civil-unioned couples, the state-imposed marriage/civil union distinc-
tion forces gays and lesbians who seek private-sector benefits for
themselves and their partners to "out" themselves in the private
arena, most often to their employers or coworkers. 6 This makes gays
III N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N, FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE NEWJERSEY CIVIL UNION
REVIEW COMMISSION 9 (2008), http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/lst-
InterimReport-CURC.pdf. The report confirms that Vermont, which has had civil unions
since 2000, continues to experience these problems, while Massachusetts, which legalized
same-sex marriage in 2004, does not. See id. at 5, 7-9.
112 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
113 See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999 (D. Neb. 2005)
("Civil marriage is a creature of statute."), rev'd on other grounds 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir.
2006).
114 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'[P]reserving the
traditional institution of marriage' is just a kinder way of describing the State's moral dis-
approval of same-sex couples.").
115 One relatively trivial yet clear example of a private actor using the government classifica-
tion to discriminate is the decision of eHarmony.com, an online dating website, to deny
service to gays and lesbians. The company's founder Neil Clark Warren justifies its policy
on the basis that, inter alia, "[S]ame-sex marriage is illegal in most states[, and] '[w]e
don't really want to participate in something that's illegal.'" Janet Kornblum, eHarmony:
Heart and Soul, USATODAY, May 19, 2005, at ID.
116 In order to seek healthcare benefits, for example, gay job applicants and employees must
inquire as to whether the employer provides equal benefits to married and civil union
couples. See, e.g., Schwaneberg, supra note 63 ("'I called to ask if they were going to be
honoring th[e civil unions] law and providing me with the same coverage that they would
any married couple, and I was told no ... .'" (quoting Jennifer Bonfilio)).
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and lesbians vulnerable to further discrimination, because those "who
identify themselves as homosexuals may be stigmatized as 'willing to
defy or violate' [traditional values, mores, and] norms" ' 7 in the eyes
of others. Thus, if private actors wish to discriminate against or so-
cially ostracize their gay coworkers, the state-created and maintained
distinction between the marital status of gay and straight couples al-
lows and enables that private unequal treatment.
The Constitution is concerned with state action promoting private
discrimination against gays and lesbians. Lawrence v. Texas con-
demned state sodomy laws because the criminalization of homosex-
ual conduct "in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres.""5 Similarly, Romer v. Evans invalidated a state constitutional
amendment for placing "[h] omosexuals, by state decree.., in a soli-
tary class with respect to transactions and relations in both the private
and governmental spheres."" 9 Private discriminations that would not
take place but for state facilitation, in particular those targeting gays
and lesbians, are therefore subject to equal protection scrutiny. 12°
B. Unlocking Private-Sector Benefits
Unequal private benefits are an equal protection concern for a
second reason: the title "marriage" is itself a state-conferred benefit
insofar as it is a key that unlocks private-sector privileges. One must
be married, for example, to be eligible for some insurance and
spousal employment benefits, as discussed above.'
State-issued identification cards offer an illuminating analogy.
Unlike a driver's license, a state identification card does not confer
any obvious public benefit (setting aside, arguendo, recently enacted
117 Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
118 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (emphasis added); see also id. at 576 ("[T]he Texas criminal
conviction carries with it the other collateral consequences always following a conviction,
such as notations on job application forms, to mention but one example."). Although
the Lawrence decision purported to make a substantive due process argument, equality
themes were pervasive and the majority opinion bears importantly on the principle of
equal protection. See EsKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 6, at 280-81 (commenting on the
important equal protection themes in the majority opinion and their complementarity
with the Court's liberty argument).
119 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) (emphasis added).
120 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622-24 (1991) (striking down ra-
cially motivated peremptory challenges in civil cases because the discrimination is facili-
tated by the court).
121 See Rhoads-Weaver & Rhoads-Weaver, supra note 87, at 544 (discussing one couple's diffi-
culty in obtaining health insurance coverage); supra note 108.
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laws requiring government-issued identification to vote).122 The iden-
tification card is useful inasmuch as it permits access to various pri-
vate-sector benefits: consuming alcohol in a bar, flying on a com-
mercial airline, and opening a bank account, to name just a few. Like
marriage, the identification card is itself a state-issued benefit that
enables activity within the private sector.
Denial of state identification cards to a disfavored class would cer-
tainly raise a question of constitutional magnitude. In fact, Congress
recently enacted a law setting minimum uniform standards for state-
issued identification cards, including a rule barring undocumented
immigrants from obtaining identification cards and setting limits on
those obtained by resident aliens.1 23 While the constitutionality of this
new law is in dispute, there is little doubt that the limits on access to
state identification cards raise a facial equal protection question.1
4
The card, although conferring no subsidiary state privileges, is itself a
benefit of constitutional magnitude because it acts as a key issued by
the state to unlock private-sector benefits. Similarly, marriage-or, to
make the analogy more precise, the marriage license-unlocks count-
less private-sector benefits. Denial of marriage licenses to same-sex
couples therefore raises a question of constitutional magnitude in an
equal protection analysis.
But reducing marriage to a set of instrumental privileges-be they
conferred by the private sector or the state-mischaracterizes the in-
stitution's core value. Although access to tangible privileges is impor-
tant and may indeed be a necessary element of a successful equal pro-
tection claim, same-sex couples desire marital recognition in large
part because of the centrality of marriage to identity. An important
aspect of the marital relationship for many same-sex couples, not yet
mentioned in the present analysis, is its religious significance. This,
too, raises a question of constitutional magnitude.
122 See, e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (enjoining
enforcement of a Georgia law requiring a government-issued identification card to vote).
123 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief (REAL ID Act), Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (creating "REAL
ID Act").
124 See Requirements for Driver's License/I.D.: Hearing on S.B. 189 Before the H. Comm. on State Af-
fairs, 23d Leg., (Ak. 2006) (statement of Margaret Stock, Associate Professor of Law,
United States Military Academy at West Point), available at http://www.legis.state.
ak.us/basis/get-single-minute.asp?session=24&begline=00170&endline=O 196&time=
0809&date=20060427&comm=STA&house=H (arguing that the REAL ID Act violates the
Alaska and U.S. constitutions).
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IV. EXPANDING THE DISCUSSION BEYOND EQUAL PROTECTION: CWIL
UNIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The question of whether civil unions present a deprivation of con-
stitutional magnitude is not limited to the realm of equal protection.
Denial of the label "marriage" presents a question of constitutional
law because it amounts to a facial deprivation of equal protection and
because it runs afoul of the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause. 1
25
It may seem unusual to discuss the Establishment Clause in the
context of an equal protection analysis, but the Religion Clauses are
themselves "an early kind of equal protection provision... assur [ing]
that government will neither discriminate for nor discriminate
against a religion or religions." 6 In recognizing opposite-sex reli-
gious unions as valid marriages, but declining to extend the same
recognition to same-sex religious unions, the state discriminates
against those religions that perform same-sex marriages.
The debate over whether same-sex unions constitute marriages is
the leading religious controversy of the day. Major worldwide reli-
gious denominations including the Methodist, Presbyterian, Lu-
theran, and Anglican branches of Christianity127 and the Conservative
branch of Judaism 128 have faced the serious prospect of permanent
division over this issue. This Part argues that the state violates the Es-
tablishment Clause, both in doctrine and in aspiration, when it takes
sides on such a salient and contentious religious controversy.
Civil unions set the Establishment Clause issue in bold relief. As
Andrew Koppelman observes, two separate matters are at stake in the
conventional debate over same-sex marriage: an administrative ques-
tion and a normative question.' 29 The administrative question ad-
dresses whether same-sex couples should have access to the same
rights and privileges as their opposite-sex counterparts; the normative
question addresses whether the law should take a moral stance
against same-sex unions. By guaranteeing equal rights and privileges
to same-sex couples, civil union states have resolved the administra-
tive question. In those states, opponents of same-sex marriage must
125 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
126 Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 491 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, J., concurring
and dissenting), rev'd on other grounds Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004).
127 SeeKoppelman, infra note 144, at 10 n.21.
128 See infra note 161.
129 See infra note 144.
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therefore ground their argument in the belief that the law ought to
take sides on the normative question of whether gay unions consti-
tute marriages.
This background sets the stage for the Establishment Clause ar-
gument. Instituting civil unions as the alternative to marriage for gay
couples runs afoul of the Establishment Clause on two grounds: it
lacks a secular legislative purpose and it constitutes an impermissible
endorsement of one religious view over others. '
3
A. Religious Purpose
Creating a separate legal institution for gay and lesbian couples
lacks a secular purpose. To avoid privileging one religion over others
and religion over irreligion, the Establishment Clause compels legis-
latures to enact laws for secular goals. Although laws may be moti-
vated by a variety of purposes, courts look to the legislative history in
identifying the predominating purpose.1
32
The predominating purpose motivating the exclusion of gays and
lesbians from state-recognized marriages is religious. Speaking of
policies that exclude gays and lesbians, Episcopal Bishop V. Gene
Robinson observed,
There is perhaps no other prejudice ensconced in the laws of this land so
based on sacred scripture, so entwined with our theological understand-
ing of the nature of humankind and the sexuality which proves to be its
blessing and its curse. No other attitude in the body politic is so tied to
an attitude stemming from a particular Judeo-Christian teaching.
Change in no other social attitude in the secular culture is so tied to
change in religious belief.
13 3
130 1 understand that the argument set forth in this Part will likely be unpersuasive to most
United States courts today. Nonetheless, the argument is doctrinally sound and contrib-
utes to the scholarly discourse on same-sex marriage and civil unions.
131 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1987) (removing a creationism law
for lacking a secular legislative purpose, as required by the Establishment Clause); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985) (striking down a school prayer statute for lack-
ing a secular purpose); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (invalidating a state re-
quirement to post the Ten Commandments in schools for lack of a secular purpose).
132 See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 588-89 (scrutinizing the legislative history); Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 59 (drawing evidence from the legislative history).
133 Audio file: V. Gene Robinson, Bishop of N.H., Lecture at Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center 2007 Goodwin Symposium: 30 Years After Anita Bryant's
Crusade: The Continuing Role of Morality in the Development of Legal Rights for Sex-
ual Minorities, at 57:50 (Nov. 27, 2007), available at http://ww.nsulaw.nova.edu/
goodwin/videos/2007/robinson.wmv. An article based on this talk is forthcoming. 32
NOVA L. REv. (forthcoming 2008).
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This may explain why the movement to exclude gay couples from the
institution of marriage has been a fundamentally religious move-
ment. 34 Legislators and activists alike have publicly professed their
opposition to gay marriage for religious reasons. Presidential candi-
dates-even those who support civil unions-have relied on religious
beliefs to explain their opposition to same-sex marriage. 35 One New
York assemblyman echoed this common view, explaining his opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage as religious, and adding that he would not
support a bill extending marriage to gays "unless God sends a mes-
,036sage to me during the next two hours of the debate." Doug
Stiegler, Executive Director of the Family Protection Lobby in Mary-
land, lobbied legislators with this message: "Marriage is, by God's
definition, one man and one woman .... Marriage and family is the
bedrock of any society. It's been here since the beginning of time.
Gays and lesbians have not been here since the beginning of time.'
37
Oregon's gay marriage ban, enacted by citizen-initiative, owes its
success to aggressive political organizing by evangelical churches.13
Churches that organized petition drives to qualify the gay marriage
ban for the 2004 general election ballot declined to circulate peti-
134 Indeed, the entire public policy discourse about the status of gays and lesbians in Ameri-
can society is inseparable from religious themes. At a congressional hearing, General Pe-
ter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained that he supports the military's
"don't ask, don't tell" policy because gay sex is "'counter to God's law,'" adding, "'My up-
bringing tells me that sexual activity outside the bonds of marriage between a man and a
woman is immoral."' Josh White, Pace's Remarks on Gays Upset Hearing on Hil WASH. POST,
Sept. 27, 2007, at Al6.
135 See, e.g., David Domke, How Are the Main Contenders Handling the Faith Issue?, USA TODAY,
Dec. 3, 2007, at 13A (quoting John Edwards' religious explanation for his opposition to
same-sex marriage); accord, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Michael Powell, Between Pulpit and
Podium, Huckabee Straddles Fine Line, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at Al (urging passage of a
constitutional amendment banning gay marriage to bring the Constitution in line with
"God's standards").
136 Michael M. Grynbaum, Gay Marriage, a Touchy Issue, Touches Legislators' Emotions, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2007, at B5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137 Kelly Brewington, Gay Marriage Case in Md. Court; State's Highest Court Weighs Right to Wed;
Judges Ask Few Questions as Scene Outside Is Quiet, BALT. SUN, Dec. 5, 2006, at IA (internal
quotation marks omitted).
138 See Bill Graves, Gay Marriage Fight Takes Shape, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), July 31, 2004,
at AO ("The Defense of Marriage Coalition successfully placed the measure on the fall
ballot this week by drawing heavily on churches to collect more than 240,000 signa-
tures."); Bill Graves &Jeff Mapes, Faith Politics Could Tip Vote, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.),
Oct. 30, 2004, at DOI ("Some congregations have become active in the [marriage amend-
ment] campaign by canvassing neighborhoods, registering voters, displaying campaign
signs, distributing campaign literature, and calling voters. Several also have shown a
DVD, during church services, in support of [the gay marriage ban] produced by the
measure's sponsor, the Defense of Marriage Coalition.").
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tions to oppose the state's new domestic partnership law," 9 however,
and the referendum consequently failed to garner enough signatures
to qualify for the ballot.' 4° These actions have brought into focus the
view of many religious activists and legislators that reserving civil mar-
riage for heterosexual couples is a religious concern, while any other
legal status gays might obtain is not.141
The most commonly asserted secular purpose for same-sex mar-
riage bans is that the state should sanction heterosexual marriage as
the optimal condition for childrearing."' This asserted purpose
amounts to little more than a non sequitur, however. The state does
not seriously purport to encourage gays and lesbians to marry people
of the opposite sex and to raise children in the context of those mar-
riages. Nor is there any evidence that same-sex couples not permitted
to marry will decline to have children. (By any account, children
raised by same-sex couples are worse off when their parents lack the
status of civil marriage.)1 43 Since same-sex marriage bans do not re-
sult in any practical benefit to children, one is left to conclude that
the childrearing account is nothing more than a secular reframing of
the belief that the law should codify moral precepts.'
One might project a variety of other secular purposes attained by
banning same-sex marriage, among them: using state resources to
incentivize childrearing in the context of historically reliable oppo-
145
site-sex relationships, or conversely, using state resources to support
139 See Bill Graves, Clock Ticking for Gay-Rights Law Foes, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Aug. 14,
2007, at AO1 (describing the petition drive opposing Oregon's domestic partnership law).
140 See Michelle Cole, Opponents of Domestic Partnerships Fall Short, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.),
Oct. 9, 2007, at C01 (reporting that volunteer signature-gatherers fell 116 signatures short
in a failed attempt to repeal the state's domestic partnership law).
141 This Comment has offered just a few pieces of evidence supporting its claim that legisla-
tion opposing gay marriage lacks a primarily secular purpose. To successfully litigate this
point, one would need to offer significantly more evidence.
142 See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution:
A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 49 (2004) ("By making marriage a
permanent sexual union based on the fidelity of both spouses, the state seeks to increase
the likelihood that children will be raised in 'intact' families, cared for by their mother
and father.").
143 See supra note 35, 95.
144 See generally Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 7-15 (2004) (discussing the problem of conflating utilitarian and
normative arguments in the same-sex marriage debate).
145 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003) (arguing that
one purpose for resisting same-sex marriage is the inconclusiveness of scientific evidence
as to the impact of same-sex parents on childrearing).
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"all too often casual or temporary" heterosexual relationships likely
to produce unplanned pregnancies.
146
These hypothetical purposes fall short. First, advocates of reserv-
ing marriage for opposite-sex couples would be hard pressed to argue
that these theoretical purposes have actually motivated legislators.
47
Even if some legislators had these purposes in mind, evidence that re-
ligious purposes have predominated is overwhelming. Second, when
a state offers all of the material benefits of marriage to same-sex cou-
ples in the form of civil unions, these secular purposes no longer
make sense.148 Civil union states no longer provide greater financial
resources to opposite-sex married couples than to same-sex civil-
unioned couples. Since the state's allocation of resources is equal
among gay and straight couples, the only legislative purpose remain-
ing must be symbolic.
Those who defend the distinction between marriage and civil un-
ions may account for this symbolic distinction as the legislature's
wholly secular deference to public opinion or tradition. But these
purportedly secular purposes are merely proxies for the impermissi-
ble religious purpose, since religious notions about marriage have
shaped the traditional norm and public opinion. 149  If these appar-
ently secular stand-ins for religious purposes could save a statute,
then school prayer, Ten Commandments monuments, and creation-
ism curricula would be defensible on the same ground. 0 The sym-
146 See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (arguing that marriage can be
viewed as a sort of heterosexual welfare program).
147 The Establishment Clause test is of a law's subjective purpose. See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) ("In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask whether gov-
ernment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion." (emphasis added) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
148 The Arizona Court of Appeals explained that state's limitation of marriage to opposite-
sex couples this way: "[B]y legally sanctioning a heterosexual relationship through mar-
riage, thereby imposing both obligations and benefits on the couple and inserting the
State in the relationship, the State communicates to parents and prospective parents that
their long-term, committed relationships are uniquely important as a public concern."
Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). If Arizona adopted
a civil union law, this explanation would be nonsensical. Civil unions, like civil marriage,
"impos[e] both obligations and benefits on the couple and insert[] the State in the rela-
tionship." Id. If gay and straight relationships alike are "uniquely important as a public
concern," id., then something else must explain why only heterosexual couples are enti-
tled to the special status afforded by civil marriage.
149 See Robinson, supra note 133.
150 Seventy-nine percent of Americans support the teaching of creationism in public schools,
James Glanz, Survey Finds Support Is Strong for Teaching 2 Origin Theories, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2000, at Al, and creationism represents the "traditional" western view of the origins of
life. Still, laws mandating the teaching of creationism are unconstitutional because they
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
bolic purpose underlying the marriage/civil unions distinction is, at
its core, religious.
151
B. Endorsement of One Religious Tenet over Competing Views
For most Americans, a marriage is a religious rite performed by a
member of the clergy. 52 The officiant serves a dual role as religious
leader and agent of the state."' But when the state declines to recog-
nize some religious weddings as marriages, it expresses a preference
for those religious rites to which it affords complete sanction. Since
state endorsements of religions or religious beliefs are impermissible
under the Establishment Clause, 54 this declared preference is uncon-
stitutional.
Marriage has been recognized as a religious rite by the Supreme
Court. In Turner v. Safley, 55 a case protecting the right of inmates to
marry, the Court acknowledged, "[M]any religions recognize mar-
riage as having spiritual significance; for some inmates and their
spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise
of religious faith .... ,,5 By recognizing a religious wedding as a civil
ceremony, the state sanctions the religious rite. This is in contrast
are motivated by religious purposes. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-86
(1987) (striking down a creationism education law). One might distinguish creationism
and Ten Commandments monuments on the ground that they are inherently religious in
nature, while opposition to same-sex marriage is not. So-called "intelligent design" cur-
ricula and moments of silence (rather than vocalized prayer) are not inherently religious,
however, and deference to tradition and public opinion do not save them either.
151 In an interview with the New York Times, Justice John Paul Stevens floated a similar argu-
ment in support of abortion rights. SeeJeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 50 ("[R]estrictions on a woman's right to choose may be uncon-
stitutional because they reflect religiously motivated views about human life-thus violat-
ing the government's responsibility under the First Amendment to be neutral between re-
ligious and secular viewpoints.").
152 See Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 96 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) ("[Marriage] is perhaps
best known as an ecclesiastical institution.").
153 This dual role is evident when examining the memorable wedding script: "By the power
vested in me, by. .. ." See Rhoads-Weaver & Rhoads-Weaver, supra note 87, at 544 (dis-
cussing state endorsement in the traditional wedding script).
154 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 575 (1989)
("[Tihe Constitution mandates that the government remain secular, rather than af-
filiat[ing] itself with religious beliefs or institutions, precisely in order to avoid discrimi-
nating.... ."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... .").
155 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (recognizing a constitutional right to marry by overturning Missouri's
ban of marriages for the incarcerated). For more information, see supra text accompany-
ing note 42.
156 Id. at 96.
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with some European countries that recognize only civil marriages
performed by justices of the peace or other state authorities; religious
weddings in these countries are entirely separate and have no civil
significance. 1
57
Many (if not most) same-sex unions are religious marriages. 58
Same-sex marriages are performed and recognized by Jewish de-
nominations including Reform,"59 Reconstructionist,'16 and Conserva-
tive;' 6' some Episcopalians 62 and other mainline Christian denomina-
tions, such as the United Church of Christ; 63 as well as other religious
groups, including Unitarians and some Buddhists.'" These religious
marriages are performed in the same types of ceremonies and by the
same clergy who, when acting with the sanction of the state, perform
opposite-sex unions. But states that recognize only civil unions for
same-sex couples express a preference for opposite-sex religious
weddings over same-sex unions.
It is true that religious clergy can officiate at and solemnize a
same-sex civil union just as they can an opposite-sex marriage. 65 But
civil unions are not religious rites, while marriages are. By recogniz-
157 See, e.g., Embassy of France in the United States, Getting Married in France, http://www.
ambafrance-us.org/visitingfrance/marriage.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (describing the
civil and religious marriage processes in France).
158 See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 2, at 749 (discussing one gay couple's religious wedding).
159 See Linda Kulman, Helping "Two People Who Love Each Other," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Apr. 10, 2000, at 50 (stating that the Central Conference of American Rabbis overwhelm-
ingly passed a resolution allowing Reform Jewish rabbis to officiate at same-sex ceremo-
nies).
160 SeeJosh Lipowsky, Civil Union Clause Draws Mixed Reaction, JEWISH STANDARD (N.J.),Jan. 4,
2007, available at http://www.jstandard.com/articles/2076//Civil-union-clause-draws-
mixed-reactions ("[T] he Reconstructionist movement sanctions gay marriage .... ").
161 See Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Jews Allow Gay Rabbis and Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2006, at A26 ("The highest legal body in Conservative Judaism ... voted yesterday to al-
low the ordination of gay rabbis and the celebration of same-sex commitment ceremo-
nies.").
162 See Sharon LaFraniere & Laurie Goodstein, Anglicans Rebuke U.S. Branch on Blessing Same-
Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at Al (discussing the American Episcopal Church's
performance of same-sex unions).
163 See Shaila Dewan, United Church of Christ Backs Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y TIMES, July 5, 2005,
at A10 (reporting on the denomination's acceptance of gay marriage rites); see also Kop-
pelman, supra note 144, at 10 n.21 (documenting the division among Christian denomi-
nations concerning same-sex marriage).
164 See generally Harry Knox & Sharon Groves, World Religions and the Struggle for Equality, HU-
MAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.hrc.org/issues/religion/1252.htm (de-
scribing the various religious positions on same-sex marriage).
165 See Oregon Family Fairness Act, H.B. 2007, § 2(8), 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or.
2007) (explaining that civil unions can be solemnized by clergy, but no religious solemni-
zation is necessary).
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ing only one type of religious union as a valid marriage, the state ex-
presses its preference for that religious rite over its counterparts.
One might counter this argument by observing that the state regu-
larly takes sides among competing religious tenets, for example,
when it deems that divorce is permissible and polygamy is not. First,
divorce is distinguishable on the ground that, unlike marriage, it is an
entirely secular, civil process. Legal divorces do not occur at religious
ceremonies. They are not performed or overseen by clergy and they
lack the religious context of (even civil) marriages. 16 6 Second, divorce
and polygamy are distinguishable on the ground that the state has a
secular utilitarian interest in permitting divorce and proscribing po-
lygamous marriages; 67 by contrast, civil union states lack any secular
interest in withholding the title of marriage from same-sex couples.
168
Third, unlike divorce and polygamy, the validity of same-sex mar-
riages is the leading religious controversy of our day. Major Christian
and Jewish denominations have faced the serious specter of perma-
nent division over this issue.' 69 The religious conflict's salience impli-
cates Establishment Clause doctrine in two ways: first, when the state
weighs in on the leading religious controversy of the day, the "rea-
sonable observer" is likely to interpret the state's decision as a reli-
gious endorsement;' 70 and second, the aspiration of the Establish-
ment Clause is that the state not pick sides in such a fundamental
religious clash .
166 Furthermore, permitting divorce is the religiously neutral state position, since it allows
adherents to abstain from divorce because their religion forbids it.
167 The state's interest in permitting divorce is, inter alia, to maximize individual autonomy.
The state's interest in proscribing polygamous marriages is, inter alia, to prevent the sub-
jugation of women. The prudence of these policies is not at issue. This Comment only
asserts that secular utilitarian interests distinguish the cases of divorce and polygamous
marriage from the case of the civil union state that bars same-sex marriage.
168 See supra Part IV.A.
169 SeeKoppelman, supra note 144, at 10 n.21.
170 One relatively trivial yet clear example of this phenomenon is the decision of eHar-
mony.com, a dating website founded by evangelical Christian leader Neil Clark Warren
that promotes religious marriage, to deny service to gays and lesbians. Rather than justi-
fying the company's decision on disputed religious grounds, Warren argues that because
same-sex marriage is illegal in most states, "We don't really want to participate in some-
thing that's illegal." See Kornblum supra note 115. By endorsing Warren's religious views,
the state provides him a sort of "political cover," even in the context of a religiously
themed website. Rather than justifying the website's policy on religious grounds, Warren
appeals to state authority as if to say, "Our decision is justified because the government
endorses our religious view."
171 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (holding that the Estab-
lishment Clause requires "neutrality," which is absent "when the government's ostensible
object is to take sides"; and arguing that this "understanding [was] reached... after dec-
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This type of religious preference is impermissible under the Estab-
lishment Clause, which "at the very least, prohibits government from
appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from
'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community." 17' The state takes a strong posi-
tion on a religious question by recognizing the validity of opposite-sex
religious unions but not same-sex religious unions.1 73 Essentially, the
state communicates that Southern Baptists are right and Episcopali-
ans are wrong; Orthodox Jews are right and Reform Jews are wrong;
Seventh Day Adventists are right and Unitarian Universalists are
wrong. Moreover, the state makes this important religious distinction
"relevant to a person's standing in the political community"'74 by de-
priving gay couples of married status, perhaps the status most relevant
to one's standing in the American political community. 75 The state's
refusal to accord civil legitimacy to religious same-sex marriages is
therefore an impermissible endorsement of religion under the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.
ades of religious war, that liberty and social stability demand a religious tolerance that re-
spects the religious views of all citizens.... ." (second and third alteration in original) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 197-98 (1992) (arguing that "the Establishment Clause
extinguished" the use of "[r]eligious grounds for resolving public moral disputes"). Sul-
livan provides extensive doctrinal support for her view that the Establishment Clause's as-
piration is one of secular neutrality in government decision-making. Her view is also
grounded in the history of America's church-state separation. SeeJohn Rawls, The Idea of
an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1987) ("The social and historical
conditions of modern democratic regimes have their origins in the Wars of Religion fol-
lowing the Reformation and the subsequent development of the principle of tolera-
tion .. ..").
172 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989).
173 Indeed, this is precisely why conservative churches have been so active in barring state
recognition of same-sex marriages: they want their religious beliefs codified in law. See,
e.g., Kirkpatrick & Powell, supra note 135 (describing the view of Mike Huckabee, a presi-
dential candidate and evangelical pastor, who supports a constitutional amendment ban-
ning gay marriage in order to bring the Constitution in line with "God's standards"); Edi-
torial, Mr. Spitzer and Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at A24 ("Religious groups,
particularly the Catholic Church, are likely to be the bill's most outspoken opponents. It
should be clear that these religious institutions have the right to refuse to marry anyone
within their own religious houses. But they should not be allowed to dictate who can and
cannot be married by the state.").
174 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 883 (internal quotation marks omitted).
175 American political discourse and public policy is heavily focused on promoting marriage
and providing for families headed by a married couple. Indeed, "[t]he family is the most
important organizing unit of our society." Katz, supra note 26, at 61-62.
JOURNAL OF CONS77TUTIONAL LAW
CONCLUSION
Acting at the direction of its State Supreme Court, the New Jersey
legislature has now enacted a civil union statute, extending to same-
sex couples all of the legal incidences of marriage but also codifying
their disfavored status in law. Echoing a Massachusetts Supreme
Court justice's Shakespearian play on words,7 6 New Jersey's Justice
Albin, writing for the court's majority, suggested that the different
status might not be an unequal status, rhetorically asking, "what's in a
name?" 177 The answer to his question: quite a lot.
Unaddressed in the present analysis is perhaps the greatest ineq-
uity of the civil union scheme: lack of recognition in other jurisdic-
tions. Although a same-sex couple in Vermont, New Jersey, Con-
necticut, or California may receive most of the state-conferred
tangible benefits afforded to their straight counterparts, nearly all of
those benefits and protections evaporate as soon as that couple
crosses state lines.178  And even while that same-sex couple remains
within its home state, it receives no privileged recognition or tangible
benefits from the federal government."" Because no government en-
tity is responsible for the inequalities perpetrated by other govern-
ment entities, this consideration fails to establish a facial equal pro-
tection claim.1
8 0
Although this Comment argues that the title "marriage" is a bene-
fit of constitutional magnitude, it does not address whether an over-
riding factor-be it deference to tradition,'"' concern for institutional
176 In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 n.1 (Mass. 2004)
(Sossman,J., opinion) (quoting Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet).
177 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (NJ. 2006).
178 See, e.g., Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 479-80 (App. Div. 2005) (hold-
ing that a surviving civil-unioned partner has no claim in tort for the wrongful death of
his spouse in New York).
179 See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)) (declining to afford any federal recogni-
tion to same-sex marriages recognized by state governments).
180 See Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 101 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (calling this "real in-
jury.. . a situation over which neither the legislature nor this court has any power").
181 One wonders whether tradition alone is sufficient to make a normative equal protection
argument. As Justice Holmes famously said, "It is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from imitation of the past." 0. W. Holmes, Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of
Mass., The Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston Uni-
versity School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897). But see Amy L.
Wax, The Conservative's Dilemma: Traditional Institutions, Social Change, and Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv'. 1059, 1097-103 (2005) (arguing that "[h]abit, custom, tradi-
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stability, or something else-might justify the marriage/civil union
inequality. Nor does it address what level of equal protection scrutiny
courts should apply to this classification.
Even if the classification were held constitutionally invalid, this
Comment does not presume that elevating same-sex relationships to
marriage status is the only available remedy.18 2  One solution pro-
posed by some gay rights advocates would eliminate state recognition
of "marriage" altogether. The state would grant civil unions to oppo-
site- and same-sex couples equally, leaving the definitionally loaded
status of marriage to the private and religious spheres. Alternatively,
the state could afford no privileged status to committed, romantic,
monogamous relationships, guaranteeing equal benefits to all family-
like relationships, whether between cohabitating sisters, friends, or
spouses. Or states could "unbundle" marriage rights, allowing indi-
viduals to parcel out the legal entitlements of marriage to the friends
or family-members of their choosing.
1 4
No matter what the particular remedy, however, the increasingly
popular civil union solution faces significant constitutional hurdles.
Civil union proponents argue that depriving same-sex couples of the
title of marriage does not raise a constitutionally cognizable inequal-
ity. But one has little doubt that if a legislature stripped another dis-
favored class of that venerated title-say Native Americans or the dis-
abled-judges would rightly acknowledge the obvious inequality and
proceed to apply the standard equal protection scrutiny. Insisting
tion, and settled understandings" provides a persuasive reason to resist same-sex mar-
riage, which must be overcome by same-sex marriage advocates). Holding on to traditiori
for its own sake is a trend being confronted in many arenas. See, e.g., David S. Conners, A
Ghost in the Catalog: The Gradual Obsolescence of the Main Entry, 55 SERIALS LIBRARIAN
(forthcoming 2008) (arguing that persisting in using outdated concepts prevents needed
adaptation to novel conditions).
182 See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring in result)
("Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two remedial alterna-
tives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the
class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute
to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion.").
183 See Watson, supra note 92 (discussing "[b]eyond [m]arriage" movement, which advocates
this policy solution). Watson discusses a move in this direction by the City Council in Salt
Lake City, Utah, where an "ordinance [was adopted] that allows employees to choose
their own 'adult designee' to receive spousal benefits. This designee could be a room-
mate, relative or a domestic partner who lives indefinitely with the employee and is finan-
cially connected to the employee. .. ." Id.
184 See Conley, supra note 6 ("We could go down the list of rights and responsibilities embed-
ded in the marriage contract.... [And] everyone [could] have the freedom to decide
how to configure his domestic, business, legal and intimate relationships in the eyes of
the law.").
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that marriage and civil unions are equal belies the very reason for the
distinction. Policymakers and members of the public do not hold
them to be equal, which is precisely why it is so important to so many
people that marriage be withheld from same-sex couples. Gays and
lesbians are not blind to the important difference between a marriage
and a civil union, and neither is our Constitution.
